YSG — Deck
Guangzhou-based Yatsen Holding makes its money in Chinese beauty — Perfect Diary made it the country's #1 mass color cosmetics brand in 2020, and acquired premium skincare brands Galénic, DR.WU and Eve Lom now generate over half of revenue.
Q4 2025 was either the inflection or the warning — both essays cite the same chart.
- The bull's chart. Quarterly operating margin marched from −34% (Q4 2024) to −4.1%, −5.1%, −8.4%, and −0.9% (Q4 2025) on revenue reaccelerating to +18% YoY. Four straight quarters compressing toward a breakeven line that hasn't been crossed since 2019; FY2025 closed non-GAAP positive at ¥8.4M, the first time since IPO.
- The bear's chart. Selling & marketing — the only line item that moves operating margin in this model — printed at 64.8% of revenue in Q4 2025, up from 60.1% in Q4 2024. The single number the FY2026 thesis depends on moved against the thesis on the most recent print, in the most important traffic quarter of the year.
- One print resolves it. Q1 2026 results land mid-May. Below 60% S&M and at-or-above-zero non-GAAP operating margin, and the four-quarter compression survives a non-Double-11 quarter. Above 60%, and Q4 was a Double-11 sugar high.
World-class gross margin, sub-scale operating margin, fortress balance sheet — the gap between the lines is the entire investment case.
Mix shift from color cosmetics to premium skincare drove gross margin from 64% to 78% in seven years; selling & marketing intensity (still 63% of revenue) is the only thing keeping operating margin negative. With ¥1.05B of cash, zero financial debt, and a four-quarter trajectory toward breakeven, the equity is being priced as if breakeven won't arrive — net of cash, the operating brand portfolio is worth roughly nothing.
No longer a Perfect Diary stub — color is a managed-decline cash unit; skincare is now most of the company.
Then. The 2020 IPO sold a 'data-driven' mass color cosmetics story — Perfect Diary on Tmall, KOL-and-livestream moat, 32M DTC customers as the headline metric. The Tmall traffic engine compounded into a ¥165B market cap by February 2021.
The break. Revenue collapsed 35% in FY2022 as Douyin replaced Tmall as China's dominant beauty traffic source — at roughly twice the cost per acquired customer. The 32M-customer metric vanished from disclosures; KOL/MCN was quietly dropped from the moat description.
Now. Skincare hit 53% of FY2025 revenue (61% in Q4) on +63% growth; color cosmetics declined 9% in Q4 and is being managed for cash. Acquired premium brands — Galénic, Eve Lom, DR.WU — are the engine. Non-GAAP profitability arrived 14 quarters after the pivot was announced.
Founder controls 91% of the vote, just wired personal capital in at the bottom — and is also the related-party counterparty.
- The voting lock. CEO Jinfeng Huang holds 35% of the economics and 91% of the votes through 600M Class B shares carrying 20 votes each. Hillhouse and ZhenFund together own 28% of the equity but control under 5% of the vote. There is no contestable board outcome.
- The convertible. March 2026 — Huang personally subscribed to ~half of a US$120M (¥860M) convertible alongside Trustar Capital. 1.5% coupon, 20% conversion premium, warrants on top. Bull reads 'I believe'; bear reads cheap related-party paper minorities can't access, with proceeds earmarked for the same premium-skincare-M&A mandate that produced ¥757M of Eve Lom impairments.
- Related-party purchases doubled. Inventory and services bought from companies under Huang's control: ¥138M (FY22) → ¥285M (FY24), now 8.3% of revenue. Pricing methodology and counterparty breakdown not disclosed.
Three dated events in the next four months settle the central operating question.
- April 30 — FY2025 20-F. Audited financials, Eve Lom carrying-value review, related-party-transaction footnote, class-action contingency. The first chance to spot a third Eve Lom goodwill writedown.
- May 15 — Q1 2026 print. Management guided ¥958M–¥1.08B revenue (+15% to +30% YoY). The number that matters is S&M as percent of revenue: below 60% confirms the four-quarter trajectory; above 60% says Q4 was Double-11 noise.
- By June 30 — Trustar second tranche (~¥430M) closes. Whether the second tranche actually funds — and whether management has earmarked a specific acquisition target — tells you whether the war chest is for a sub-¥200M tuck-in or another premium-brand bet on the Eve Lom pattern.
Lean cautious — the operating lever moved the wrong way in the very quarter that was supposed to settle it.
- For. Operating margin compressed from −34% to −0.9% across four quarters; first non-GAAP profit since 2019 in FY2025; skincare crossed 53% of mix on +63% growth.
- For. ¥1.05B of cash plus zero financial debt inside a ¥1.87B market cap — net of cash, the operating brand portfolio is priced near zero. Founder personally subscribed to the March 2026 convertible at the bottom of a 99% drawdown.
- Against. S&M intensity rose to 64.8% in Q4 2025 from 60.1% — the single number the FY2026 thesis depends on, moving against the thesis on the most recent print.
- Against. 91% voting lock, doubling related-party purchases, and a convertible earmarked for the same premium-brand-M&A playbook that produced ¥757M of Eve Lom impairments. No mechanism for value to accrue to minorities if it works.
Watchlist to re-rate: (1) Q1 2026 S&M / revenue and non-GAAP operating margin (May 15). (2) How the Trustar second tranche is deployed (by Q3 2026). (3) Skincare share holding above 60% as color cosmetics shrinks.